This article examines the political rhetoric of NATO Secretary General Anders F. Rasmussen during his term in office (2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014). The officially conducted public diplomacy of A. F. Rasmussen is analysed based on the poststructuralist theoretical assumptions in order to detect the manifestations of discourse of danger in NATO-Russia relations during the years 2009-2014.
Introduction
The Russian annexation of Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine had a wide impact on NATO identity. The vast amount of publications, conferences, discussion panels and other events that sprawled after the commencement of events in Ukraine tend to purvey the idea of a 'wake-up' call. It is usually simplified down to a single proposition: up until the Crimean annexation by Russia, NATO was living in a dream-like world where Russia was considered to be a friend of the Alliance. Events in Ukraine suddenly changed everything and proved that NATO was living in a fantasy all along 1 . However, this approach seems to be flawed. First of all, research shows that NATO-Russia relations after the end of the Cold War could never be considered to be in a permanent state. They have always been in fluctuation -T. Forsberg and G. Herd identify at least four different attempts by NATO to improve relations with Russia since the end of the Cold War, all followed by periods of hostility and mistrust 2 . Therefore the description of NATO's attitude towards Russia as somewhat fixed is inaccurate. Second, the popular opinion that NATO was 'sleeping' and now got a 'wake-up' call from Russia lacks scientific evidence. As T. Forsberg and G. Herd point out, the Russian actions in Ukraine came as a 'surprise to NATO, although the surprising aspect was rather the timing and the fast direct annexation of Crimea rather than Russia's willingness to use force against Ukraine' 3 . The claim that NATO was caught unaware in Ukraine needs to be examined closer and the question about the dynamics of NATO-Russia relations leading up to March 2014 remains unanswered.
As former NATO Secretary General (SG) Anders F. Rasmussen assumed the office in August 2009, he had a lot to deal with since Russia flexed its muscles in Georgia and the relationship was practically non-existent. Regardless, Rasmussen embarked on a mission to engage Russia in a constructive dialogue and has named this goal as one of the priorities of his incumbency. Retrospectively, this attempt at relationship improvement was a failure. How did it happen? Why was the SG not been able to reach one of his most ambitious objectives?
While the study of Forsberg and Herd is an extensive and the most up-todate account of NATO-Russia relations since the beginning of 1990s, it fails to expand on the recent period of the relationship -the term of SG Rasmussen. The authors touch upon it only very briefly and do not go into a lot of detail. I attempt to fill this gap. Using the poststructuralist research design to study the discourse of danger, I describe the NATO-Russia relationship in the years 2009-2014 through the lens of Rasmussen.
The fundamental question I try to answer is the following: what was the role of discourse of danger in the rhetoric of Rasmussen with respect to NATO-Russia relations? The objective here is to describe the discourse of danger in the public speeches of SG and to evaluate how it is being used to promote the idea of what are the NATO-Russia relations based on.
This paper introduces the concept of discourse of danger (as formulated by D. Campbell). The article contains extensive analysis of the discourse of danger related to Russian identity formation produced by Rasmussen. Finally, I provide the insights on the empirical findings and make generalizations about the dynamics of NATO-Russia relations during the years of Rasmussen.
David Campbell and the discourse of danger
For D. Campbell, 'identity is an inescapable dimension of being. Nobody could be without it. Inescapable as it is, identity -whatever personal or collective -is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behaviour. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behaviour. Difference is constituted in relation to identity' 4 . What Campbell is pointing out here is the idea that identity and difference are interrelated and constitute one another. We can grasp the existence of difference only by comparing (or creating) identities, but these identities in turn are created by the production of difference itself. As Campbell himself has indicated, 'the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self ' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 'foreign' 5 . This is achieved through threat perception. In fact, as has been argued by Campbell, the perpetual need of a collective community to have the referent objects of threat is vital to the identity of the community itself: 'The articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility' 6 . I use these Campbellian theoretical assumptions of threat and danger to study the risk perception of NATO, and how this threat perception was driving its relations with Russia during the years 2009-2014.
Ontological proposition offered by Campbell forms the basis of my work. The understanding of threat and danger is not only the most important aspect of the formation of alliances such as NATO. Discourse of danger has to be constantly recreated, updated and enshrined into the minds of the public in order to maintain the current status of the alliance in order to prove the necessity of having such structures of power assertion. NATO, at least during the years when Rasmussen was in office, never was in a situation of danger-free world. There always has to be an outside threat to maintain the purpose of the collective defence community. No alliance has any purpose if it does not have an adversary to fight against. My research primarily focuses on the NATO-Russia relations and how discourse of danger played a part in them.
Rasmussen and the discourse of danger: empirical analysis
The first record of Rasmussen speaking in public as SG of NATO was on August 3, 2009 -his introduction speech upon assuming the office. The last address he gave in this capacity was on 23 September 2014, named 'NATO: A long blue line for security'. Throughout his term, Rasmussen has publicly spoken on 609 different occasions, producing a total of 784,074 words.
The focus here is on the representations of Russia in this discourse. 'Russia' and its various grammatical forms like 'Russian', 'NATO-Russia', etc. have been mentioned a total of 2620 times by Rasmussen. This may not seem much -only 0.33% of a total discourse. However, I used the software of 'Voyant Tools' 7 to eliminate the words in Rasmussen's rhetoric, which are considered to be of general nature and not conveying any meaning. What was left are 17,197 'unique words'. The word 'Russia' and its grammatical forms comprise a total of 15% of all the 'unique words' used in the discourse of Rasmussen. More popular ones are 'NATO', 'Afghan', 'security' and 'defence'. This shows that the topic of Russia was one of the most often occurring themes in the discourse of SG.
The popularity of 'talking about Russia' has seen major ups and lows throughout the term of Rasmussen. The problem here is the fact that all of these periods have a different number of total words, and their time frames are only approximate. This may affect the reliability of reporting the number of 'Russia' mentions in each period. I solve this problem by drawing a derivative variable which is the mentions of 'Russia' per every 10,000 words in each period. This makes the effect of slightly varying dates and different number of words unimportant. The data for each period is indicated in Table 1 : What becomes clear is that throughout Periods 1-3 the usage of 'Russia' mentions in the discourse of SG is evidently stable, hovering along 29-36 mentions every 10,000 words for approximately 3 years. However, in Period 4 it takes a deep plunge to only nine mentions per 10,000 words and in Period 5 it reaches its record level of attention -54 mentions. This transformation is captured in Figure 1 My analysis focuses on the Russia mentions in these five separate segments of time. By reading the rhetoric of SG, I analyse the language used in the context of NATO-Russia relations and how the discourse of danger (words like 'threat', 'danger', 'risk', 'challenge', etc.) is reproduced in these speech acts, contributing to the identity of the Alliance and its role in the world vis-à-vis Russia.
Period 1: building bridges, thinking alike NATO-Russia relations were in a dire state before Rasmussen started his term. During his first address as SG of NATO, Rasmussen indicated that he wants to make the improvement of NATO-Russia relations as one of the priorities of his term. He also noted that he is not a 'dreamer' and 'it is obvious that there will be fundamental issues on which [NATO and Russia] disagree'. 8 These ideas of 'fresh start' were very popular during Period 1, accompanied by the argumentation that NATO and Russia should view each other as partners against an outside threat like terrorism or missile attacks. Diplomatic efforts of Rasmussen to improve the relationship and find ideologically common ground with Russia were very evident.
The first broader articulation on how this improved relationship may be implemented occurred in a first major speech of Rasmussen on September 18, 2009 -ambitiously named 'NATO and Russia: A New Beginning'. A.F. Rasmussen noted that 'We spend too much energy on what divides us. We should instead focus on what unites us'. This call for unity was accompanied with three proposals: First, 'NATO and Russia should immediately look to reinforce our practical cooperation in all the areas where we agree we face the same risks and threats to our security -and there are many of those areas'. Second, the rejuvenation of NATO-Russia Council with a purpose to make it 'a forum where we can all air our differences openly and transparently, and where all our security concerns are discussed -including Russia's'. Third, Rasmussen introduced an unprecedented proposal for NATO and Russia 'to carry out a joint review of the new 21st century security challenges, to serve as a firm basis for our future cooperation'.
All these three proposals seem to be part of an effort to build a common identity of NATO and Russia as equal partners, united by common enemies. Rasmussen admitted that 'Russia is a great European power, with her own point of view and her own interests'. Then SG went on to illustrate the convergence of these interests with those of NATO -namely in the areas of 'fight against terrorism', 'preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery', 'missile defence', Afghanistan (with a strong emphasis on 'counternarcotics training') and 'maritime security'. According to SG, these are the areas where NATO and Russia face the same threats and which have to form the basis of practical cooperation among them. That is the underlying reason why Rasmussen proposed to agree on a NATO-Russia document -'joint review of NATO's and Russia's common threats and challenges'. He even referred to Russia's 'Security Strategy Until 2020', which 'very much like NATO, is grappling with the new and rapidly evolving security environment'. Following this logic, SG also pointed out that 'We should use the NATO-Russia Council to identify those areas where our interests converge and where further cooperation would be beneficial'.
This use of common discourse of danger is evident in Rasmussen's public speaking events throughout Period 1. The emphasis on 'common threat' was constantly overriding the 'disagreements' of NATO and Russia in other areas. The necessity to bring Russia into the European security community was illustrated by Rasmussen as follows: 'Carnegie's Dimitri Trenin once described Russia as being merely the planet Pluto in the 'Western solar system'. In other words, while it is formally part of the system, it is located out on the fringes where it is lonely, cold and frustrated' 9 . After the speech at Carnegie, Rasmussen seemed optimistic about his proposals. During his monthly press conference on 7 October 2009 he said that 'I'm pleased to say that we have gotten off to a good start. My proposal to conduct a joint review of 21st century security challenges has been taken up and I think it could be the basis for us to see, with fresh eyes, that we share common threats' Out of all the areas of common threats to NATO and Russia that SG pointed out, missile defence gained a prominent position in the discourse of Rasmussen. SG indicated that 'the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is of concern not just to NATO nations, but to Russia too. Our nations, and our forces deployed in theatre, will all become increasingly vulnerable to missile attacks by third parties'
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. This is the first instance where a common threat from missiles was articulated more broadly by Rasmussen. On 27 March 2010, Rasmussen, speaking about the missile threat, said that 'If Iran were to complete this development, then the whole of the European continent, as well as all of Russia, would be in range' 15 . This is an example of how SG dedicated a lot of energy to show that missile defence is in the interests of both NATO and Russia. He also stressed the importance of 'missile defence as another opportunity to bring us together' 16 and that 'one security roof would be a very strong political symbol that Russia is fully part of the Euro-Atlantic family, sharing the benefits and the costs -not outside, but very much inside'
17
. This expression corresponds to previous portrayals of Russia as Pluto in the Solar System of European Security -somebody who needs to 'come home'.
However, speaking on 7 May 2010, SG expressed his concerns on NATORussian cooperation on missile defence: 'I am aware that Russia's current views on missile defence range from hostile to ambivalent. And I am also aware that there are technical hurdles that would have to be overcome in linking up our systems'
18 . But he also was optimistic about the possibilities to overcome these differences by calling for 'one security roof ' 'that protects us all -by linking up 19 . This idea of common shield against a missile threat was repeated by SG during his trips in Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, multiple times during his monthly press conferences, as well as at the Brussels Forum 2010 and Georgetown University. This is a sign of tremendous diplomatic effort to prove that common NATO-Russia identity does exist with respect to common threats.
The issue of missile defence and the Joint Review of Threats were the two main factors that have been used by Rasmussen in his attempt to bring NATO and Russia closer together in Period 1.
There is no clear indication during the Period 1 that SG would have portrayed Russia as a threat to NATO since a lot of energy was spent on doing the opposite. Speaking in Moscow, Rasmussen stressed that 'NATO will never attack Russia. Never. And we do not think Russia will attack NATO. We have stopped worrying about that and Russia should stop worrying about that as well'
20
. However, the need for such reassurances (when SG needs to remind the audience that Russia is not a threat to NATO) is puzzling because there are no examples of such language used with respect to other countries -for example, there was never a time when the word 'threat' was used in the same sentence with 'China' as a linguistic construction.
In case of 'Russia', the word 'threat' has been used 12 times by Rasmussen in the same sentence during Period 1. Out of these, five were direct reassurances that NATO does not pose any threat to Russia, six were reassurances that missile defence plans of NATO are not directed at Russia, and one was the common discourse of danger -portraying terrorism as something that poses danger to both Russia and NATO (Table 2) . Table 2 : Occurrences of 'Russia' and 'threat' in the same sentence during Period 1.
Reassurances of no threat to Russia

Reassurances about missile defence Common threats
Occurrences of 'Russia' and 'threat' in the same sentence
This need for reassurances on threat perception and especially missile defence can be interpreted in two ways, which are compatible with each other: a genuine call by Rasmussen to forget the tensions between NATO and Russia; and as a sign 19 Ibid. 20 Rasmussen, NATO and Russia.
that not everything seems to be rosy between the two and diplomatic efforts to overcome this are necessary.
Two other examples of uneasiness during Period 1 are of notice. First of all, it is the issue of Georgia. Rasmussen repeatedly described the Russian actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 'disagreement' between NATO and Russia, and expressed his view that Russia must meet all of its obligations under the international law. Second, during the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in April 2010, NATORussia Council meeting did not take place. Asked by a journalist whether it is a sign that Russia and NATO does not see eye-to-eye on certain issues, SG replied that 'on this occasion there was not substantive results to discuss with this', indicating that a 'productive' meeting took place in December 2009. He also said that 'we meet when there is something concrete to discuss. So I have to say there's nothing dramatic in the fact that we do not have a NATO-Russia Council here in Tallinn'   21 . It can be argued that this rhetoric of 'nothing to discuss' is just a sign of strains in the relationship.
However, Period 1 has been marked more by an extensive attempts to bring NATO and Russia together by common discourse of danger, rather than hostile opinion of the first about the latter. Instances of 'no threat' reassurances by NATO were common, 'disagreements' acknowledged, but not escalated to the level of 'threat' or 'danger'. Overall, SG positioned the identity of NATO to be welcoming the fact that Russia is an important global player who has a lot of common ground with NATO. A massive campaign on common dangers to both NATO and Russia was launched, calls to end the historical hostility towards one another were very sound.
Period 2: positivity and engagement
The first mention of 'Russia' in Period 2 came when a journalist asked SG whether NATO should view Russia as a threat or as a partner in the new strategic concept. Rasmussen's answer was clear -Russia should definitely be considered as a partner of NATO, with a status of 'special partnership' 22 -a phrase that portrays Russia somewhat in a league of its own. Period 2 can be considered as a remarkably positive stretch in NATO-Russia relations, during which favorable views of Russia were the most evident throughout the term of Rasmussen. On 17 September 2010, SG gave a speech named 'Success generates success: the next steps with Russia'. He defined the strategy of NATO dealings for Russia. First, SG said that NATO and Russia are drawn together by 'shared dangers', namely terrorism and WMDs
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. Then, SG highlighted three areas where progress in NATO-Russia relations can be made -missile defence, conventional arms control and reduction of short-range missiles. With regards to missile defence, Rasmussen said that it 'is coming to Europe' and 'this will go one of only two ways' -either NATO does it alone, or includes Russia in the common system of missile defence 24 . SG made it clear he prefers the second option because otherwise 'we would risk that Russia, rightly or wrongly, would be kept outside the tent, and, as a result, unsure of how this might affect her security' 25 . Two points are of note here. One, this is the first time that Rasmussen spoke about the inevitability of missile defence -it will be implemented regardless of Russian position. Second, SG kept a very diplomatic tone by clearly stating that Russia should be part of this system and not 'kept outside the tent'. He said this makes sense for a number of reasons, mostly appealing to common discourse of danger -a shared threat from missile attacks, primarily from Iran, common security roof that protects all, etc.
Missile defence became a central topic in NATO-Russia relations throughout Period 2. Rasmussen anticipated that NATO Lisbon summit in 2010 will be a place where NATO will commit to develop a missile defence system and that this decision 'should be accompanied by an invitation to Russia to cooperate' 26 . This manifest desire to include Russia 'in the tent' of missile defence is probably the reason why in Period 2 we see a slight increase of 'Russia' mentions compared to Period 1 (see Figure 1) . Also, Period 2 saw two major speeches by Rasmussen on missile defence, whereas in Period 1 there are no records of such initiative. On Russia, SG gave three major speeches in Period 2 (and two speeches in Period 1).
The logic of why Russia should be part of NATO missile defence is based on a common discourse of danger scattered throughout Period 2. SG said that 30 countries are trying to acquire missile capabilities and 'we cannot turn a blind eye to this problem. It is real. It is growing. And it threatens not just NATO nations, but Russia too' 27 . The common missile defence system can also help to save costs, have better and more precise information, and increase the will for NATO-Russia cooperation in other areas 28 . Lisbon summit became a high point in NATO-Russia relations of the entire term of Rasmussen, mostly because after a lot of speculation, Russian President Medvedev agreed to attend the summit. Second, NATO allies adopted a new strategic concept, which labels Russia as a strategic partner of the Alliance 29 . This provision of the strategic concept stands to this day. Third, a final version of Joint Review of Threats to NATO and Russia was presented. Speaking about this document, SG said that 'while we face many security challenges, we pose no threat to each other'. With regards to common threats, Rasmussen noted that 'we have identified the real threats, including terrorism, the proliferation weapons of mass destruction, of the spread of missiles that can hit our territory even today, and piracy' 30 . Finally, SG was sure in Lisbon that NATO-Russia relations have turned a page. He said that 'today, we help not only bury the ghosts of the past that have haunted us for too long. We exorcise them' 31 . Rasmussen also pointed to an agreement among NATO and Russia regarding missile defence -'starting today, we [NATO and Russia] will begin working on missile defence cooperation' 32 . The optimism of Lisbon Summit is very clear in the speeches of Rasmussen. The expectations were high for the possibilities of cooperation in missile defence, and the assessment of common threats was regarded as a monumental achievement. SG viewed it through the prism of common discourse of danger as the cooperation between NATO and Russia is necessary to counter the new challenges. And this cooperation cannot be overshadowed by 'disagreements'.
As in Period 1, negative portrayals of Russia in Period 2 were rare and far in between. Some examples, however, are of notice. First, SG pointed out that a decision by Russia to insert troops and missiles into Georgia is a 'dangerous move' and 'the recognition by Russia of the so-called independence of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is also unacceptable to NATO Allies' 33 . Again, Rasmussen also noted that 'we cannot let this paralyse everything', which means that the issue of Georgia is something which is only a nuisance that can be rid of.
Second, there were instances when SG blamed Russia for irrationality. Speaking about the advantages of missile defence, Rasmussen mentioned the political, economic and military benefits from cooperation with Russia. However, he also pointed out that 'What does NOT make sense, is for Russia to talk about spending billions of roubles on a new offensive [missile] system to target the West. This type of rhetoric is unnecessary. This type of thinking is out of date. This type of investment is a waste of money. Because, we are not a threat to Russia. We will not attack Russia. We will not undermine the security of Russia. The threats to Russia come from elsewhere' 34 . This is by far the strictest rhetoric by SG in both Periods 1 and 2. It portrays Russian position as irrational, something that is a 'waste of money'. Also, Rasmussen very clearly intended to accentuate that NATO does not pose a threat to Russia -an example of reassurances that were evident in Period 1.
On reassurances, some changes in rhetoric start to appear. First, just like in Period 1, Rasmussen repeated that NATO does not pose any danger to Russia -the actual number of such mentions actually slightly increased from five to seven. However, in Period 2, there are no reassurances that NATO missile defence program is not directed against Russia. It must be noted that these were replaced with a shift in diplomatic tone from reassurances to the common discourse of danger -the words 'Russia', 'missile' and 'threat' in the same sentence purveyed a unified meaning that NATO and Russia face a common threat of missile attackhence a 10-fold increase in instances of 'common threats' from Period 1 to Period 2, mostly comprised of speeches on missile defence (Table 3) . In short, Period 2 has not seen a major shift in diplomatic tone of Rasmussen towards Russia. But a strong emphasis on NATO missile defence, high expectations of Russia to cooperate on this matter, and the success of Lisbon Summit were accompanied by the logic of common discourse of danger -NATO and Russia face the same threats. The usage of a metaphor that Russia is still outside the tent of European security system was present, and it was used to support the idea of extending an invitation for Russia to join this system. A monumental achievement -Joint Review of Threats -was announced in Lisbon Summit, however, no mentions of it are registered later in NATO-Russia relations. Period 2 was the one were diplomacy was the warmest, and the expectations for improvement were the highest.
Period 3: emergence of differences
Since the days of Lisbon Summit, Rasmussen repeatedly said that with regards to missile defence, there is only one variant under discussion -separate NATO and Russia systems, that work with each other through information sharing, joint command centres and other measures of cooperation. The first mentions of 'Russia' in Period 3 came exactly in this context -speaking about the preparations for Chicago Summit 2012, Rasmussen said that 'our vision for a future structure of missile defence systems is two independent systems, a Russian system and a NATO system, but two systems with a common purpose' 35 . However, this idea of common purpose has been challenged later. Only two months after the last declaration of an idea on 'two systems, one purpose', Rasmussen expressed some discontent over the remarks by Medvedev: 'Some of President Dmitri Medvedev's recent comments about NATO's missile defence system reflect a misunderstanding of the system. As a result, Russia has suggested deploying missiles in areas neighbouring the alliance. Such suggestions reflect the rhetoric of the past and are inconsistent with the strategic relationship NATO and Russia agreed to seek'. This is a very serious departure from a previous dominance of 'common security roof ' agenda proposed by Rasmussen. There were a few occasions in Period 2 when SG portrayed Russia as somewhat irrational state that wastes money on offensive missile technology. But this is the first instance when he labels Russia as not fully understanding the benefits of the system, and muddling in the nature of politics reminiscent of the past, rather than modern era. . Even more so, he went further and said that 'Russia is prepared to respond to our plans by deploying missiles in areas neighbouring the Alliance. I have to say that such responses remind us of the confrontation of a bygone era. And they suggest a fundamental misunderstanding' 37 . This goes one step further by increasing the negativity level attached to Russia. Although SG dismissed the rhetoric of Medvedev as 'empty threats', which 'are also influenced by the electoral mood in Russia'. This sort of language would have been unimaginable in Period 2 just a couple of months before.
This soaring relationship was not a one-off occurrence as well. Just a couple days later, Rasmussen declared that 'as far as missile defence is concerned, progress has been slower than I had hoped, and expected' 38 . Speaking after the NRC meeting, SG reiterated that 'Our positions may not always converge. … That is particularly the case with missile defence. It's no secret that differences remain on how to organise our cooperation in this area' 39 . This acknowledgement of differences on missile defence joined two other 'differences' (NATO Open Door policy and Georgia).
An interesting point to note is the occurrence of discursive ultimatums by Rasmussen in Period 3 towards Russia. The deadline for an agreement on missile defence between NATO and Russia has been established by SG to be the Chicago Summit. On 26 January 2012, asked by a journalist about the situation in this area, Rasmussen replied that 'On Russia, I still hope we will be able to reach an agreement with Russia on missile defence cooperation. However, I also have to make it clear that we have not made much progress so far. We have had a lot of talks. These talks will continue. Maybe we will not have a clarified situation until a few weeks before the Summit. We still keep it as an option to have a NATO-Russia Summit in Chicago, but if there's no deal probably there will be no Summit'
40
. He also added that 'I do believe that Russian leaders will realize that it's also in their interest to cooperate with NATO on missile defence' 41 . A.F. Rasmussen held a particularly interesting press conference on March 26, 2012 where he invited only Moscow-based journalists for a Q&A session. This event took place just about two months leading up to Chicago Summit and was a source of clarifications on NATO-Russia relations at the time. SG reiterated that 'NATO and Russia are not adversaries or enemies' and 'NATO system is not directed against Russia' 44 . A particular change in rhetoric was on the issue of whether Russia will attend the Chicago Summit. At a time, it became clear that Putin has won a presidential election in Russia. Rasmussen's comment was the following: 'I spoke personally with Prime Minister Putin when I called him to congratulate him on his election as new President of Russia. And we also discussed the possibility to have a NATO-Russia Council meeting in Chicago. But we both agreed that due to the very busy domestic political calendar in Russia, it's probably not possible to have a NATO-Russia Council meeting in Chicago' 45 . This is a U-turn on the position held earlier by SG that NRC meeting in Chicago would only take place if a deal on missile defence could be reached. However, this argumentation has changed dramatically after the election of Putin, and underlying reasons for not having this meeting became schedule differences. In the end, NRC meeting in Chicago never took place.
Two weeks after the Chicago Summit (where decisions to go ahead with missile defence technology were made), Rasmussen indicated that 'I know Russia's concerns on this issue [of missile defence]. So let me be quite clear: those concerns are groundless. NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia, and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrent' 46 . This is both an example of increasing necessity for reassurances about a defensive nature of NATO's missile defence systems, and a contribution towards labelling Russia as an unreasonable actor in international relations -someone whose calculations are completely groundless, unrealistic and based on the 'ghosts of the past'. A few paragraphs later, Rasmussen even went further by directly saying that some Russian activities are causing 'concerns' for the Alliance: 'We welcome our cooperation with Russia, and we want to strengthen it. But we are concerned by some recent Russian statements, including on military deployments close to NATO borders' 47 . While this is not the same as declaring that these actions are 'dangerous', a shift from 'disagreement' to 'concerns' regarding the deployments of troops or equipment in the vicinity of NATO could be considered as a new emerging line of diplomacy.
However, disagreements on missile defence in Period 3 were somewhat downplayed by Rasmussen through the efforts of highlighting the areas of mutual interests: 'It's a fact that our discussions on missile defence haven't made a negative impact on cooperation in a number of other areas. Actually, we have seen steady progress in our cooperation in a number of areas, across the board, from Afghanistan where the Russians have delivered a valuable transit arrangement, to counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, count-piracy, just to mention some of the practical areas in which we have enhanced our cooperation with Russia' 48 . But none of these 'success' stories gained such a prominent attention both from Rasmussen and journalists posing the questions in press conferences as missile defence did. These reminders of common areas of action are more like intentions to salvage a constructive relationship when clear division lines on missile defence started to appear.
Just as in Periods 1 and 2, Period 3 was heavily influenced by the pursuit of common enemies and threats. Common threats (usually related to common 46 Anders F. Rasmussen, 'Monthly press briefing'. Brussels, 4 June 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/opinions_88130.htm?selectedLocale=en. 47 Ibid. threat of missile attack) remained to be used steadily. Of particular interest is the comeback of reassurances that NATO's missile defence system poses no threat to Russian security. These are the two elements of diplomatic rhetoric by Rasmussen -a constant reproduction of an idea that NATO and Russia share a common threat from missiles and that defensive mechanism of NATO will not be directed at Russia. The need for the usage of both of these elements is a sign that diplomatic efforts to persuade Russia were starting to break down (Table 4) . Apart from these uncertainties, one more interesting occurrence is evident in Period 3. Rasmussen started to express his concerns about shrinking NATO defence budgets: 'And our defence budgets are not immune to this crisis. Actually, between 2008 and 2011, twenty NATO nations reduced their defence spending'
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. SG contrasted this with Asian and Russian experience: 'This goes against the trend we can see in much of the rest of the world. This year, for the first time, Asian defence spending will outstrip that of NATO's European Allies. And Russia is planning to double its defence spending over the next decade' 50 . Immediately after this Rasmussen pointed out that 'These declining European defence budgets are a concern. Because every cut today will have consequences for our security tomorrow'. Now, SG has not explicitly said that Asia or Russia pose these possible security 'consequences', but contrasting these regions and portraying them as growing military powers does send a signal that NATO's influence is shrinking and something needs to be done about it.
Period 4: diplomatic isolation
What is striking about Period 4 is the fact that a number of 'Russia' mentions has decreased dramatically compared to Periods 1-3. On average, throughout 49 Rasmussen, NATO 2020. 50 Rasmussen, NATO 2020.
Periods 1-3, SG would mention 'Russia' around 32 times every 10,000 words. In Period 4, this number decreased down to only nine mentions.
This diplomatic isolation can have many reasons, but analysis of the language used throughout Period 4 does not reveal a massive change in rhetoric towards Russia -there simply is significantly less of it. For example, on missile defence Rasmussen remained rather disappointed: 'We have invited Russia to cooperate on missile defence. So far, we have not seen significant progress. Actually, we have not seen progress at all' 51 . It is nothing new -this language on difficulties to reach any kind of deal on missile defence is consistent with the one used in the second half of Period 3. Whenever Rasmussen talked about Russia in Period 4, he did so only after being challenged on the topic by journalists. The thematic speeches on a specific subject of NATO-Russia relations (which epitomized Periods 1-3) are non-existent in Period 4, and SG himself clearly avoided the topic of Russia. The diplomatic attention dedicated to Russia in itself was extremely low, but the avoidance of speaking about Russia is truly remarkable.
On the occasions that SG mentioned Russia, it was not necessarily in a positive manner. For example, while speaking about the worrying trend in NATO for countries to reduce their defence budgets, Rasmussen gave an example of China and Russia: 'By 2015, China will outspend the eight major NATO European Allies combined. And Russia intends to double its defence budget from 3% to 6% of Gross Domestic Product within the next 10 years'
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. Then he added that: 'The rise of emerging powers will create a gap between their ability to act, and ours. Now, do not get me wrong. I am not implying their rise will pose a direct threat to the Alliance. But if we continue on our current path and further diminish defence spending, we will see our influence diminish on the international stage just as fast' 53 . The SG was careful enough to underline that this trend of increasing military budgets in Russia does not pose a direct threat to NATO, however, he acknowledged that it presents a possibility of waning global power of NATO. The portrayal of Russia as an 'emerging power' does not create a strong discourse of danger, but it draws the attention of audiences to the idea that current NATO position can be challenged in the future if proper financing of military is not taken seriously. SG uses elements of discourse of danger to persuade NATO governments to reconsider military spending practices. The sentences with 'Russia' and 'threat' in them were practically non-existent in Period 4 (Table 5) , with an exception of mentions on common threats -namely terrorism (two occurrences). The conclusion is that even though discourse on Russia remained consistent with the end of Period 3 (common threats, disagreements on missile defence, Georgia, and open door policy), but diplomatic rhetoric became sparse and increasingly colder, showing more signs of frustration.
Period 5: transforming the discourse of danger
The first mention of 'Russia' in Period 5 came on 2 October 2013, when Rasmussen issued a statement in which he said that 'I note with concern the Russian Federation's continued activity in erecting fences and other obstacles along administrative boundary lines within Georgia'
54 . This statement of concern towards Russian actions in Georgia (described as fences and obstacles) is a substantially more hostile portrayal of Russian policy in the region than a previously used wording of disagreement. This statement is an illustration of a complete turn in NATO-Russia relations in Period 5.
What makes it remarkable is that after an isolationist Period 4, Period 5 is the one with the largest amount of 'Russia' mentions -a total of 1025 (54 every 10,000 words). This is nearly twice as much as in the second most active Period 2, and more than fivefold increase on Period 4.
This surge in political rhetoric towards Russia is due to Crimean annexation by Russia and its participation in armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The reasons for these Russian actions are an object of debate among the scholars of international 54 Anders F. Rasmussen, 'Statement on obstacles along administrative boundary lines in Georgia'. Brussels, 2 October 2013. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_103815.htm?selectedLocale=en relations but it is clear that these developments completely overhauled the portrayal of Russia in the entire NATO public diplomacy.
The first negative impression regarding Russian actions towards Ukraine came in on December 2, 2013 when a journalist enquired about Rasmussen's point of view on rumours that Russian army is preparing to enter Ukraine. SG replied that: 'We are following the developments in Ukraine with great concern' 55 . While expressing his concern, Rasmussen did not specify that the cause of it is Russia. A few weeks later, he was more specific: 'It's clear that we have seen a more assertive Russian position'. However, while the position of Russia is considered more 'assertive', SG did not point out that this assertiveness causes any concern for NATO. As a matter of fact, Rasmussen gave a speech a month later on 1 February 2014, called 'NATO and Russia -Time to Engage'. This was the first major speech on Russia delivered by SG for a long time, where he emphasized various areas of cooperation with Russia (such as terrorism) -both existing and potential. 56 No rhetoric of 'concern' or 'threat' has been recorded in this speech, which contained the language just as optimistic as it was in Period 1.
This . SG also gave reasons why this is the case -he said that the amount of troops involved is the largest for decades, it threatens the freedom of 45 million people and that this crisis in Ukraine cannot be viewed in isolation since it has a very close proximity to NATO. 60 This discourse on the Russian threat to NATO also was portrayed as all-inclusive, challenging the entire fabric on which the existence of allies is built upon: ' We see what could be called 21st century revisionism. Attempts to turn back the clock. To draw new dividing lines on our maps. To monopolise markets. Subdue populations. Re-write, or simply rip up, the international rule book. And to use force to solve problemsrather than the international mechanisms that we have spent decades to build. We had thought that such behaviour had been confined to history. But it is back. And it is dangerous' 61 . This speech by Rasmussen is an example of the transformation of Russian identity in the eyes of NATO. Period 5 is dominated by this line of thought, and the threat of Russia has been used extensively in the discourse of SG. And this articulation of threat was direct, unambiguous, and very straightforward. Some examples of it are in order -these quotes of Rasmussen are all taken from Period 5: -'Russia's aggression against Ukraine is the gravest threat to European security in a generation' 62 ; -'Russia's aggression against Ukraine challenges our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace' 63 ; -'It is a dangerous attempt to turn back time, using the methods and the rhetoric of the past we tried so hard to overcome' 64 ;
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'the crisis has clearly shown why defence matters. It also shows that defence spending matters'. 71 The idea behind it is that Russia has been growing its defence spending for years and used the opportunities it presented in Ukraine. What Rasmussen said was that NATO allies must respond to this threat by thinking seriously about the increase in military spending.
The example of Russian military budgets has been used before in Periods 3 and 4, but then Rasmussen said that these increases pose no threat to NATO. In Period 5, this logic no longer applies and the call for increasing the spending on military in NATO is based on the rising Russian threat -a complete reversal of previous declarations.
By looking at the sentences in Period 5 where Rasmussen has used the words 'Russia' and 'threat' in the same sentence, some shifts are clear (Table 6 ). First, a new dimension of 'Russia as a threat to NATO' dominates all these sentences -17 total occurrences. We also see a comeback of NATO reassurances that the Alliance poses no threat to Russia. On a few occasions, SG emphasized that it is only the Russians who are acting irresponsibly, and NATO has no intention to attack Russia. A few mentions on common threats faced by Russia and NATO from ballistic missiles came in the early stages of Period 5 and are fringe cases. The rhetoric of common threats has disappeared completely from the speeches of Rasmussen right after the developments in Ukraine started. This is the transformation of discourse of danger. During Periods 1-3, Rasmussen used the discourse of danger to portray the common threats faced by Russia and NATO to bring these two entities closer together. In Period 5, a totally opposite approach was taken by SG. Russia became the primary prism through which NATO's identity is seen. Rasmussen pointed out at this transformation as 71 Ibid. well: 'My very first speech as new Secretary General of NATO five years ago was about developing a stronger partnership between NATO and Russia. Regrettably, Russia has rejected our efforts to engage. Instead, Russia considers NATO, and the West more broadly, as an adversary. Russia has trampled all the rules and commitments that have kept peace in Europe and beyond since the end of the Cold War. The pattern is clear. From Moldova to Georgia, and now in Ukraine, Russia has used economic pressure and military actions to produce instability. To manufacture conflicts. And to diminish the independence of its neighbours' 72 .
NATO-Russia relations: the dynamics of 2009-2014
The analysis of Periods 1-5 (August 2009 to September 2014) allows to refute the claims that NATO-Russia relations have been only in two gears over the term of Rasmussen. Empirical evidence suggests that it is appropriate to distinguish at least four different stages in NATO-Russia relations during this period: 1. Engagement. When Rasmussen took up the office of SG of NATO, clear guidelines for the improved NATO-Russia relationship were laid out. He based this vision on common discourse of danger. SG portrayed NATO and Russia as sharing the same threat from the outside -namely terrorism, missile attacks, piracy, etc. The logic behind common interests with Russia was communicated as a solid ground for engagement, reduction of disagreements, and a call for common identity shaped by outside dangers. This period of engagement lasted from the assumption of the post of SG until the Lisbon Summit, where the agenda of common threats was laid out in writing, and certain possibilities for cooperation on missile defence were pushed forward. 2. Soaring of the relationship. After the Lisbon Summit, the rhetoric towards Russia became increasingly anxious. NATO Open Door Policy and Georgia no longer were the only disagreements -it was joined by the hurdles to reach any agreement on joint missile shield. Rasmussen showed an increasingly higher degree of disappointment towards Russia. The low point of this period became the Chicago summit, which Russian representatives failed to attend. The discourse on the commonality of threats came close to empty talk with respect to missile defence, and the efforts to prove that Russians are wrong when they think that NATO's missile defences are directed at them, failed to materialize in substance. needs to be 'brought back home' to the security constellation of European defence politics. Then followed the diplomatic isolation period and after the Ukrainian crisis started, Russia was deemed to be an aggressive state that poses danger to NATO allies. The discourse of danger was the main tool to describe what role does Russia play in Euro-Atlantic security environment. Rasmussen used the discourse of common threats to bring Russia closer to NATO, and attached the label of threat on Russia when its behavior in Eastern Europe became intolerable. The dynamics of such transformation were just like they were throughout the period since the end of the Cold War -constantly changing, improving or deteriorating, never in a permanent state. Thus any claim that is made about the fixed nature of NATO-Russia relations should be dismissed. The only constant thing about this relationship is that it is never constant.
Campbell argued that discourse of danger is produced by policymakers to rally support for decisions on security thus shaping the identities of both 'Self ' and 'Other'. In Rasmussen's case, he used discourse of danger to soften the edges in NATO-Russia relations by pointing at the outside world as posing danger to both of these entities. This portrayed NATO as an inviting actor in international relations which is seeking for friendly ties with Russia. However, this proved to be a failure after Ukrainian crisis. Then discourse of danger was employed to serve another, completely opposite purpose -to portray NATO as a security guarantee for allies that protects against the Russian threat. This has brought the images of the 'New Cold War' and NATO's retraction back to its roots. This newly found identity helped to increase the cohesiveness within NATO, and proved to be extremely effective to push for increased funding to militaries. Discourse of danger was the primary tool used by SG to argue for the continuous existence of NATOwhether it is protection against terrorism, cyber or missile attacks, or even Russia.
Empirical evidence suggests that the phrase 'NATO's wake-up call' is not entirely true -the Alliance is constantly changing its view towards Russia since the end of the Cold War, and a current crisis in NATO-Russia relations should not be surprising.
